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It is pointed out that two separated quantum channels and three classical authenticated channels
are sufficient resources to achieve detectable broadcast.
This note is about broadcast (or byzantine agreement),
and should be considered as a follow-up of the paper [1].
In its simplest form, broadcast is a task involving three
parties: a sender, S, and two receivers, R0 and R1. The
sender holds an input value xs ∈ D (D denotes some
finite domain) and is supposed to send it to the two re-
ceivers. The two receivers eventually decide on an input
value in D. Amongst S,R0 and R1, one (and at most
one) player may be an active adversary and try to stop
the two other parties to agree on an input value. The
other two parties are said to be honest.
A protocol achieves broadcast if (i) it guarantees that
all honest players decide on the same output value y ∈ D,
(ii) y = xs whenever the sender is honest. One easily sees
the difficulties involved in this task if only pairwise (clas-
sical) authenticated channels are available. For example,
a cheating sender could send different bit values to R0
and R1. Thus R0 and R1 should test the honesty of S
during a phase of the protocol where they exchange their
input and check whether they match. But if one of the
receivers is dishonest, it might happen that, during this
verification phase, he sends the other receiver a value dif-
ferent from the input he actually got from the sender. In
fact, it is known that, if the only resource available to the
three players is pairwise authenticated channels, broad-
cast is impossible [2]. However, when quantum channels
are available, a variant of the byzantine agreement prob-
lem, namely detectable broadcast, can be achieved. A
protocol is said to achieve detectable broadcast if (i) it
achieves broadcast when no player is corrupted. (ii) when
one player is corrupted, then either the protocol achieves
broadcast, or all honest players abort the protocol.
Let |0〉, |1〉, |2〉 denote an orthonormal basis of a qutrit
system (a qutrit is a three-level quantum system). De-
tectable broadcast can be achieved if the three players
share many copies of the so-called Aharonov state [1]
|A〉 = 1√
6
(|0, 1, 2〉+ |1, 2, 0〉+ |2, 0, 1〉
−|0, 2, 1〉 − |1, 0, 2〉 − |2, 1, 0〉), (1)
and perform measurements on this state.
Actually, the protocol described in [1] is such that
the source of Aharonov states lies at R1’s site. Clearly,
Byzantine agreement works as well if R1 were preparing
the state |A〉〈A| and measuring her qutrit before send-
ing their qutrits to players R0 and S. Therefore, in-
stead of using |A〉, R1 can as well prepare randomly ei-
ther of the three two-qutrit states |A0〉, |A1〉, |A2〉, where
|A0〉 = 2−1/2(|1, 2〉 − |2, 1〉) (|A1〉 and |A2〉 are defined
likewise). It is thus clear that Byzantine agreement can
be achieved using only two quantum channels distribut-
ing entangled states.
But even further simplifications can be brought:
|A0〉, |A1〉, |A2〉 constitute more resources than the three
players actually need. An examination of the protocol
described in [1] shows that to achieve broadcast, all we
need is to meet the five following conditions:
1. R0 and R1 share an n-trit string K
0 ≡ k0
1
. . . k0n;
2. S and R1 share an n-trit string K
s ≡ ks
1
. . . ksn;
3. ∀j = 1 . . . n, k0j 6= ksj ;
4. ∀j = 1 . . . n, R0 has no information about ksj other
than k0j 6= ksj ;
5. ∀j = 1 . . . n, S has no information about k0j other
than k0j 6= ksj .
These conditions can be simply satisfied as follows. R1
uses two quantum channels to distribute private n-trit
strings (or keys) K0 to R0 and K
s to S, by means of
a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol [5] such as
BB84 for example [3]. The keys K0 and Ks are supposed
to satisfy the above conditions. There are two ways in
which R1 could have not done her job properly: (i) the
condition 4 or the condition 5 is not satisfied, i.e. the
keys are not secret, (ii) the condition 3 is not satisfied.
A violation of condition 4 or condition 5 would imply
that R1 cooperates with another player to cheat the third
one. This possibility is ruled out by the assumption that
there is at most one cheater. A test of condition 3 can
be performed by R0 and S (with arbitrarily high statis-
tical confidence), upon R0 sending S a randomly chosen
sample of his key. If this test fails, the protocol should
abort.
Thus, either R1 does her QKD job properly (and this
fact is acknowledged by R0 and R1) or the protocol will
abort. Assuming the first alternative, one can see, re-
peating all steps of the protocol described in [1], that
detectable broadcast can be achieved, using the three au-
thenticated channels, exactly as if Aharonov states had
been used.
The essential reason why two QKD channels are
enough to achieve broadcast is that R1 almost never talks
during the protocol described in [1]. Actually, it was al-
ready pointed out that no entanglement is necessary to
achieve detectable broadcast. A scheme involving three
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FIG. 1: Configuration necessary to achieve broadcast. Ar-
rows indicate the direction of the information flow. Wavy
lines represent quantum channels, and straight lines represent
(classical) authenticated channels.
quantum channels and QKD was proposed in [4]. The
contribution of this note is to show that only two QKD
channels are enough.
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